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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
and precludes the employment of the devices formerly utilized to
avoid taxation. It is submitted that factually the retention by the
donor of any "economic 20 benefits" moreover in the trust causes a
tax to be imposed. At last, the original intention of the designers of
the much-discussed section of the law is realized. Whether the pres-
ent amendment can be made retroactive in its scope, as is the intention
of its sponsor 2 1 is a question not at all free from doubt.
WILLIAM H. SHAPIRO.
DETERMINATION OF THE SITUS To AvoID DOUBLE TAXATION
oF INTANGIBLE.-The maxim "mobilia sequuntur personam" has
proven inadequate for the solution of all our modern problems relat-
ing to the taxation of intangibles.' It is therefore not to be expected
that it can be easily applied to the taxation of intangibles. Indeed
the Supreme Court has said of the maxim:
"It was intended for convenience and not to be control-
ling where justice does not demand it." I
With the courts, therefore, readily disregarding the maxim as
justice required, its principle soon lost significance with regard to
tangible personal property. It was held, for example, that where
personal property had acquired a permanent situs in a state, that
state had the right to tax the property regardless of the place of resi-
dence of the owner. This proposition is of course predicated on the
theory that a state is entitled to tax and to derive revenue from any
property within its jurisdiction to which it affords protection. Nor
was this proposition at all shaken by the realization that double taxa-
tion would thus ensue. In Blackstone v. Miller the proposition was
put by Mr. Justice Holmes in these words:
"The fact that two states, dealing each with its own law
of succession, both of which have to be invoked by the person
claiming rights, have taxed the right which they respectively
confer, gives no ground for complaint on constitutional
grounds." 2
SRothschaeffer, op. cit. supra note 6; see also note 5, St. John's L.
Rev. 147.
'Congressman Garner in advocating the amendment asserted that the
retroactive feature would have accompanied this act, but for the fear that
it would have defeated the entire bill-Congressional Record of March 3, 1931.
'Board of Assessors v. Comptoit National D'Escompte, 191 U. S. 388. 24
Sup. Ct. 109 (1903).2 188 U. S. 189, 207. 23 Sup. Ct. 277 (1903); see also Black, Constitu-
tional Law (2nd ed., 1897) at p. 451: "There is nothing in the Constitution
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But the doctrine of Blackstone v. Miller was not to endure.
Soon the Supreme Court found distinctions, and after the decision
in Frick v. Pennsylvania,3 Blackstone v. Miller may no longer be
regarded as authority. In the Frick case, the Court discussed the
difference between a property tax and an inheritance tax and points
out that:
"A tax is an enforced contribution of money or other
property assessed in accordance with some reasonable rule or
apportionment by authority of a sovereign state on person or
property within its jurisdiction, for the purpose of defraying
the expenses of government and continuing in operation the
various legitimate functions of the state.
"An inheritance tax is the right of the state to tax the
transfer of property." 4
Here it was held that:
"The jurisdiction possessed by the state of the situs was
not partial but plenary and included power to regulate the
transfer both inter vivos and on the death of the owner, and
the power to tax both the property and the transfer." 5
The increase in the importance of intangibles could not fail to
have important significance. When we consider the huge amount
of property consisting of corporate bonds and stock, we cannot fail
to realize that the essential problems of taxation have changed. Again
of the United States to afford protection against double taxation of a state."
263 U. S. 134 (1923): "The constitutions of some of the states contain
express prohibitions against double taxation; in others such a prohibition
is considered to follow as a corollary from the requirement of equality and
uniformity; but in some duplicate taxation is not unconstitutional and the
question of its imposition is held to be one of expediency for the considera-
tion of the legislature and not one of power for the consideration of the
courts.
Universally, however, it is considered unjust, unfair, and unreasonably
burdensome and the courts will avoid it by construction when possible; that
is, it will never be presumed that the legislature intended to impose double
taxes, but on the contrary, a statute will not be held to produce that result
unless it is so required by its plain, expressed and unmistakable terms.
Nevertheless it is not practically possible to avoid double taxation entirely.
Any comprehensive system of taxation, and particularly where taxes are
laid upon both tangible and intangible personal property, will result in some
duplications of the burden and this is not a fatal objection to a revenue
law. * * * And it is not double taxation where the same article or property
is taxed in two states, where each has a right to tax it on account of its
situs or domicile of the owner."
*268 U. S. 473, 34 Sup. Ct. 603 (1925).
'Black, supra note 2, p. 429.
Ibid. at p. 492.
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the problem of the old maxim is presented. Can it apply to intan-
gibles? In an early case the Supreme Court answered by saying:
"It is well settled that the State of the domicile may con-
stitutionally assess an inheritance tax on tangible property
within the State and on intangibles wherever found." "
However, more recent decisions have thrown some doubt on
this proposition. In the case of Francis Beidler II v. South Carolina
Tax Commission,7 it appeared that one Francis Beidler, a resident
of Illinois, died in that state leaving a will which was duly probated,
the plaintiff and one other qualifying as executors.
At the time of the death of the testator, he was possessed of
seven thousand (7,000) shares of the capital stock of Santee River
Cypress Lumber Co., a corporation organized under the laws of
South Carolina and doing business in that State. The Corporation
was also indebted to the testator in the sum of $556,864.22 for ad-
vances made by him to the Corporation and in the sum of $64,672
for dividends previously declared on his shares but not paid. These
amounts were included by the attorney-general of Illinois in com-
puting the inheritance tax payable to that State. The South Carolina
Tax Commission also levied a tax on these amounts, overruling the
claim of the executors that the State of Carolina had no jurisdiction
to impose such a tax, and that the levy of it would constitute depriva-
tion of property without due process of law in violation of the four-
teenth amendment to the Federal Constitution. The Supreme Court
of South Carolina upheld the Tax Commission, and the case was
brought to the Supreme Court of the United States for review. As
a result of this decision, it is perfectly plain that the rule in Black-
stone v. Miller " is now completely overruled for the Court definitely
held that the mere fact that the debtor is domiciled within the state
does not give it jurisdiction to impose an inheritance tax or succes-
sion tax upon the transfer of the debt by a decedent who is domiciled
in another state. The Court cites cases in which it was held that
choses in action may acquire a business situs and then looks into the
record and fails to find any evidence to warrant the finding that the
property here in question had acquired such a business situs in South
Carolina. But neither in the case referred to nor in the earlier case
of Farmer's Loan and Trust Co. v. Minnesota 9 and Baldwin v.
Missouri 10 did the Court attempt to answer the problem of whether
intangibles, if they did acquire a business situs in a state other
than that of the owner's domicile may be properly taxed by the
owner's domicile. On the whole it seems that the courts are follow-
'Blodgett v. Silverman, 277 U. S. 1, 48 Sup. Ct. 410 (1927).
'51 Sup. Ct. 54 (1930).
'Supra note 2.
'280 U. S. 204, 50 Sup. Ct. 98 (1929).
10281 U. S. 586, 50 Sup. Ct. 436 (1929).
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ing the same path with regard to intangible property as that marked
out with regard to tangible property. Intangibles, however, present
greater difficulties. Securities are easily passed from hand to hand
and likewise from state to state. In that way they might escape
taxation entirely if they were to be taxed only at the situs. The two
evils of double taxation or no taxation at all seem inescapable, but
the Court seems to prefer the latter.
In the Safe Deposit case 11 the Court held that where intangibles
had a permanent situs they are taxable in the state of the situs. In
that case a trust was established in Virginia and the Court held that
it had acquired a permanent situs in Virginia, even though the bene-
ficiaries were domiciled in Maryland. The latter state could not
impose a tax thereon, the point being made by McReynold, J.
"A statute of a state which undertakes to tax things
wholly beyond her jurisdiction or control conflicts with the
14th Amendment." 12
In Farmer's Loan and Trust Co. v. Minnesota ' 3 it is stated
that:
"Tangibles with permanent situs therein, and their testa-
mentary transfer may be taxed only by the state where they
are found. And, we think the general reasons declared suffi-
cient to inhibit taxation of them by two states apply under
present circumstances with no less force to intangibles with
taxable situs imposed by due application of the legal fiction."
But here too, there is as yet no answer to the problem of whether
intangibles may also be taxed at the owner's domicile.
It seems therefore, that the courts will recognize a business situs
for intangibles which render them subject to taxation, but has as yet
not answered the question whether these intangibles thus permanently
situated may be taxed by the state of the domicile of the owner as
well. In point of legal theory however, there would seem to be no
constitutional objection to the right of a state to tax the succession
of property no matter where situated. The view has been expressed
by eminent juristic writers.14
a' Safe Deposit and Trust Co. v. Virginia, 280 U. S. 83, 50 Sup. Ct. 59
(1929).
'Ibid. at p. 92.
"Supra note 9 at p. 211; see also (1930) 4 St. John's L. Rev. 322.
" Powell, Extra-Territorial Inheritance Taxation, (1920) 20 Col. L. Rev.
7: "Certainly, if it be true that the right of testamentary disposition is purely
statutory, the state has a right to require a contribution to a public treasury
before the bequest shall take effect. Thus the tax is not upon the property in
the ordinary sense of the term, but upon the right to dispose of it, and it is not
until it has yielded its contribution to the state that it becomes the property
of the legatee."
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Mr. Justice Holmes has consistently held that there is nothing
unconstitutional in double taxation and that the Fourteenth Amend-
ment has been stretched too far in the cases above referred to. In
these views, Justice Brandeis has concurred. Nevertheless, they
acquiesce in the case under discussion in view of the failure of their
previous views to obtain the concurrence of a majority. The failure
of the dissent to reiterate its position affords the conclusion that
double taxation may now definitely be stated to be beyond the power
of the states under the Constitution. In vain did Justice Holmes
remark:
"It seems to me to be exceeding our powers to declare
such a tax a denial of due process of law. And what are
the grounds? Simply, as far as I can see, that it is disagree-
able to a bond owner to be taxed in two places." 15
And again, in suggesting a remedy he says:
"Very probably it might be a good policy to restrict taxa-
tion to a single place and perhaps the technical conception of
domicile may be the best determinant. But it seems to me
that if that result is to be reached it should be reached through
understanding among the states, by uniform legislation or
otherwise, not by evoking a constitutional prohibition from
the void of 'due process of law' when logic, tradition and
authority have united to declare the right of the state to lay
the now prohibited tax." 16
The judicial vacillation with regard to the meaning of due proc-
ess of law is now familiar learning. But the extent of federal con-
trol over state legislation which the Fourteenth Amendment has made
possible, is still to be fully realized.
FRANCES MASLOW.
ESTATE TAX-SUCCESsIoN TAX-POWER TO RETROACTIVELY
TAX FUTURE INTERESTs-CONTRACTS.-By an irrevocable trust
created in 1907, settlors retained a life income during their joint
lives, the principal to be paid over to their five sons on the death of
the survivor of the settlors. If any of the sons should predecease
the survivor then, over to those entitled to take his intestate prop-
erty. In 1917, the settlors assigned their interest in the trust to their
sons, all of whom survived the termination of the trust. The settlors
died in 1921 and 1923 respectively, and Massachusetts sought to tax
'Baldwin v. Missouri, 281 U. S. 586, 50 Sup. Ct. 436 (1930); see also(1930) 5 St. John's L. Rev. 136.
" Baldwin v. Missouri, at p. 596; Dissenting opinion of Holmes, J.
